DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-1000

OCT 6 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR NAVY STAFF
DIRECTOR MARINE CORPS STAFF

SUBJECT: 2003 MARINE CORPS RESERVE POLICY BOARD (MCRPB) FOR STAFFING

The 2003 MCRPB convened formally from April 24-27, 2003 and September 28-October 03, 2003 with working group meetings in-between to consider issues impacting the Marine Corps Reserve and make recommendations to my office.

Those issues and recommendations are provided at attachment (1). Request your staff review and provide comments by November 10, 2003 to DASN (RA).

H.C. Barnum, Jr.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Reserve Affairs)

Attachment:
As stated

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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MARINE CORPS RESERVE POLICY BOARD

03 October 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS

Subj: REPORT OF THE 2003 MARINE CORPS RESERVE POLICY BOARD (MCRPB)

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5420.170K
(b) SECNAV LETTER TO MCRPB Chairman of 15 July 2003

Encl: (1) 2003 MCRPB issues
(2) 2003 MCRPB members

1. Purpose. To provide the 2003 MCRPB annual report to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) for staffing through the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).

2. Background. The MCRPB met 24-27 April 2003 at Marine Forces Reserve Headquarters, New Orleans, Louisiana and 28 September through 03 October 2003 at Henderson Hall, Arlington, Virginia to examine Marine Corps Reserve policy issues and propose recommendations. The issues at enclosure (1) are provided for your information and staffing to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for comment per the references.

3. Goal. The goal of the MCRPB is to provide you timely and effective policy recommendations to enhance Marine Corps Reserve and Active Component integration. Correct policies eliminate many barriers to Reserve service. Effective policy guidance may increase administrative efficiency, operational effectiveness, and the retention of our most valuable resource, our Marines.

4. Discussion. As Chairman, I was guided by the references and focused MCRPB deliberations on specific policies to enhance Total Force integration and quality of life. These issues will enhance the Total Force Marine Corps. The 2003 MCRPB communicated with commanders throughout the Marine Corps, leaders at Headquarters Marine Corps, the professional military organizations, and individual Marines and Sailors. Historically, the use of the MCRPB to recommend policy solutions

has contributed to the elimination of many barriers to Reserve service and increased the stature and quality of life of a Marine Corps reservist.

5. Personal Comments. Your support of Total Force policy matters has been vital to the Marine Corps Reserve. Measurable progress on many Total Force issues is apparent and coincides with a markedly increased reliance on the capabilities of the Marine Corps Reserve. Implementation of a process through which relevant issues are submitted to you on a continuing basis throughout the year, vice annually as part of this report, has been my number one priority while serving as MCRPB Chairman. As historical impediments are eliminated, Reserve Component operational readiness is clearly enhanced and quality of life for our Marines is improved.

6. Conclusion. I greatly appreciate the assistance provided by your Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Reserve Affairs), Mr. Harvey Barnum. I am grateful for his wise counsel, his knowledge of the issues, and his genuine concern for the Marine Corps Reserve and the Total Force Marine Corps. The MCRPB members, at enclosure (2), are also grateful for the honor of serving as members of the MCRPB. Thank you for the opportunity to serve as your 2003 MCRPB Chairman.

Very respectfully,

CORNELL A. WILSON
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Chairman,
2003 Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board

2003 MARINE CORPS RESERVE POLICY BOARD (MCRPB) ISSUE: 03-001

SUBJECT: 24-MONTH LIMIT FOR PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

DISCUSSION: The law (10 United States Code, Section 12302) states that reservists mobilized during a Partial Mobilization can be activated for 24 consecutive months; however, current OSD policy limits reservists to 24 cumulative months of activation per Executive Order. Any reservist who is activated for a total of two years during a Partial Mobilization cannot be activated for any further service under the Executive Order for that particular contingency. In effect, this means that reservists who continue to drill in SMCR units and IMA detachments, but who reach the 24-month mob limit, cannot be mobilized even if their parent unit/detachment is mobilized.

Partial Mobilization is one type of mobilization. The President declares a partial mob during a national emergency. The vehicle for this declaration is known as an Executive Order. In the case of the current Partial Mob, the POTUS issued EO 13223. Under the current law (10 United States Code, Section 12302), a Reservist could be activated for two years, deactivated for a day and then reactivated for another two years, and so on. In order to prevent that situation from occurring, OSD published a memorandum in 2002 that interpreted the law to mean 24 cumulative vice consecutive months. While this prevents our Marines from enduring repeated long-term periods of mobilization, it also limits each Marine to a total of 24 months of activation under an Executive Order declaring a partial mobilization.

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is forecasted to be a long-term fight. Current OSD policy will negatively affect the mobilization potential of many Marines if large-scale or long-term use of the Marine Corps Reserve continues.

1. The 24-month limit is per EO. For example, activated time under the DS/DS EO, or any other EO (such as Bosnia or Kosovo) does not count against the 24-month limit for EO 13223.

2. Under EO 13223 there have been three contingency operations, ONE/OEF/OIF. All three continue to remain in effect. OSD guidance is that they may remain in effect for between 5 - 20 years. A large percentage of the Marine

Corps Reserve was activated in support of these operations. Considering the length of the current war and the shortage of troops for deployment to Iraq, there is a good possibility that our SMCR units and IMA detachments may be reactivated and sent once again overseas.

3. Should reactivation occur, many of these units will have reservists who may already have reached the 24-month limit or may be close to reaching it. These Marines can volunteer to do ADSW-CO, but if they've done the 24 they cannot be activated.

4. As a result, key personnel and a large number of Reserve personnel in our units may not be eligible for activation.

In light of the information contained above, the issue in essence is broken down into two perspectives: the combatant commander's view and the individual Reservist's view.

1. Combatant Commander: GWOT will be in excess of 5 years. As such, flexibility is paramount. Reserve forces will be utilized throughout all phases of this contingency. With a limitation of 24-months cumulative service, the Combatant Commander is constrained within planning and execution. Therefore, the Combatant Commander would prefer for a 24-month consecutive service policy to support all established O-plans and Con-plans rather than a 24-month cumulative service policy. Additionally, there is an administrative burden placed on the commander of tracking the amount of cumulative time spent on active duty in support of each Executive Order.

2. Individual Marine Reservist: Multiple 24-month mobilizations may impact the retention and morale of the Individual Marine Reservist. The burden upon the individual includes: financial hardship, family separation, professional clientele problems, self-employment issues, and civilian job continuity. The possibility for inequity may exist due to specialized units and/or MOS's being repetitively mobilized (HD/LD units).

MCRPB RECOMMENDATION: Recommend the issue be forwarded to the Reserve Forces Policy Board as a matter under their cognizance. The current OSD policy of 24-months cumulative mobilization should be changed to 24-months consecutive

mobilization should be changed to 24-months consecutive service as originally stated in 10 United States Code, Section 12302.

> "In time of national emergency declared by the President after January 1, 1953, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty (other than for training) for not more than 24 consecutive months." 10 United States Code, Section 12302.

By establishing the policy to be consistent with the statute, the Services will have the flexibility to utilize their Forces to better accomplish their mission.

The policy should be established as:

Reservists can be mobilized in support of each Executive Order for a maximum of 24 consecutive months. With the consent of the individual, a reservist may be recalled for an additional 24-month period not to exceed 48 months in a 60-month period.

If a reservist serves less than 24 consecutive months, they may be recalled under the same Executive Order without their consent up to a total of 24 months.

CMC COMMENT:

DASN (RA) COMMENT:

2003 MARINE CORPS RESERVE POLICY BOARD ISSUE: 03-002

SUBJECT: SELECTED RESERVE RETIREMENT PAY ELIGIBILITY DATE

DISCUSSION:

1. Selected reservists are not entitled to receive retirement pay until age 60, regardless of when eligibility is attained through the accumulation of a minimum of twenty years satisfactory participation. This system does not contemplate extended periods of active duty, particularly involuntary recalls pursuant to mobilization orders now being experienced by many Selected Reservists.

2. Dependence of DoD on Reserves continues to grow with each passing year. Recent world events and the war on terror have required involuntary recalls to active duty for periods oftentimes in excess of one year. Further, projected force structures also will continue to rely on recall of reservists in greater numbers for longer periods of time. It is anticipated that this pace will not abate.

3. The impact of involuntary recalls in many instances subjects recalled reservists and their families to severe disruptions and negatively affects the family's finances. In many instances these involuntary recalls, and the prospect of additional recalls in the future, will negatively impact recruiting and retention in the Selected Reserve particularly in high op tempo organizations, units, and individual reservists possessing critical skills needed only in wartime.

4. Recognition of the sacrifices made during these periods of extended active duty can be given through specific retired pay eligibility credits, which enable a recalled member to draw retirement pay earlier than age sixty.

5. This policy proposal must address the rigors of involuntary recalls, which accumulate over 180 days of active duty at any time. After the accumulation of 180 days of active duty pursuant to mobilization or involuntary recall only, that member would be entitled to draw a retirement check six months earlier than current law provides. Further six-month credits can be earned through the accumulation of additional involuntary active duty in 180-day increments, limited to a total of five years' credits.

MCRPB RECOMMENDS: Nonconcur with the concept. Although we agree with the argument that our Reserve Component personnel are being called to active duty more than they have in the past, the rationale associated with this proposal does not warrant a concurrence from the MCRPB.

1. Equity: This proposal addresses increments of involuntary active duty only. However, we have individuals voluntarily doing ADSW for extended periods of time and yet they would not qualify for an early retirement. The incidence of involuntary active duty is rare. Is involuntary active duty worth more than voluntary?

2. Fiscal: Cost to DoD budget could be excessive and could impact other programs vital to Reserve members, such as compensation for BAH consistent with active duty personnel.

3. The 180-day cut-off seems to be an arbitrary number. The end strength requirement for a Reserve member to count against AC end strength is 180 days. ADSW (RC) is authorized for 179 or less.

CMC COMMENT:

DASN (RA) COMMENT:

2003 MARINE CORPS RESERVE POLICY BOARD (MCRPB) ISSUE: 02-012/03-003

SUBJECT: DISTANCE LEARNING (DL) FOR RESERVE ADMINISTRATION AND TRAINING

DISCUSSION: In 1999 the Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board recommended that the Marine Corps incorporate Reserve specific administrative requirements in the Administration MOS training school curriculum, and follow-on administrative courses.

The CMC comment stated that Distance Learning (DL) initiatives are being considered for this curriculum. SECNAV concurred with CMC to continue DL initiatives to ensure instruction of Reserve administration.

MCRPB RECOMMENDATION: That the Secretary of the Navy direct CMC to update the MCRPB on status of DL initiatives.

CMC COMMENT(S): Under the direction of the Marine Corps Distance Learning Center (DLC), a Technology Infusion Requirement Analysis of the Marine Corps Combat Service Support (MCCSSS) was conducted in May 2000, which identified the Senior Clerk Course (SCC) as a good candidate for asynchronous distance learning. At the invitation of Personnel Administration (PA) School, a follow-up Media Feasibility Study was conducted in July 2000, confirming the SCC as a good candidate for Interactive Multimedia Instruction (IMI), and/or Job Performance Aid (JPA)/Electronic Performance Support System (EPSS) mediums of delivery.

Once the SCC was identified, the PA School partnered with the DLC in Sep 2000 to replace the resident SCC, in its entirety, with IMI. This decision recognized that the number of potential SCC students far exceeded the actual throughput, in effect, creating a training gap. Out of necessity, this gap was historically addressed with significant content overlap between the SCC and the Advanced Personnel Administration Course (APAC).

The intended target audience for the SCC was the 20-30 year old active duty and/or Reserve Marine, MOS 0121 and 0151, with a high school diploma (98% of the audience), and 2 to 12 years of experience in the Marine Corps.

On 21 December 2000, a project kick-off meeting was held for the SC IMI at the DLC in Quantico, VA. The SCC IMI was to train Marines in a variety of subjects relating to the Administrative Field within the Marine Corps in order to increase their

proficiency in accomplishing tasks required in the 0193 MOS. The five broad topics to be included in this IMI project were General Administration, Files and Directives, Pay and Allowances, Service Records, and Unit Diary.

In May 2002, development of the SCC was halted by the DLC. The two main reasons for this were (1) the vendor contracted to develop the IMI lacked the capabilities to produce a quality product, and (2) the course content was determined to be too unstable, often changing due to updates to administrative policies and procedures.

In August 2002, DLC personnel conferred with LtCol Crittenden, CO PA School, MCCSSS, concerning the SCC. It was requested that the DLC not pursue further development of the SCC IMI and focus instead on the development of a DL product for a Reserve Administration Course.

Ongoing discussions are taking place between the PA School and MCI to determine if there is sufficient material and student requirement to produce a Reserve specific administration course. Currently, the Reserve Administration Course is a two-week course, taught three times a year (June, July, and August). MCI is being sent the Reserve Administration Course Program of Instruction to determine what additional course material may be required.

In addition, instructional designers from the DLC are currently conducting a gap analysis and a media feasibility study to ensure that the final DL product delivered would meet the requirements of MCCSSS. The Reserve Administration Course initiative is scheduled for presentation to the TECOM Selection Board for consideration during the Technology Based Training and Education Course Product Selection Process, scheduled in Jan 2003. Additional information concerning the Reserve Administration Course as a candidate for DL will be available after the results of the selection board are released.

DASN (RA) COMMENT(S): The MCRPB will continue to monitor the status of this recommendation until completed.

MCRPB 2003 COMMENT:

During the investigation of this specific issue for the 2003 MCRPB, the broader issue of Distance Learning for Reserve Marines became the focus of the issue. Marine Corps Distance Learning is developed and managed by two entities, both overseen

by the Training and Education Command (TECOM) - College of Continuing Education (CCE) and Marine Corps Institute (MCI).

In 2002, TECOM began delivering baseline Professional Military Education (PME) curriculum developed by resident schools; developing courses that provide training toward MOS qualification, personal development, business and informational technology training.

TECOM's website, "Marine.net" has become the portal for a multitude of distance learning courses. Marine.net is accessible via the Internet (no .mil account is necessary) and is available to Marines and dependents enrolled in DEERS. The benefits include: global access, self-paced study, interactive training, reduced learning time, and increased retention. Additionally, TECOM has exploited technology by providing Video Tele-conferencing, Learning Resource Centers, Deployable Learning Resource Centers and Automated Electronic Classrooms to Marines.

TECOM is responsible for the schoolhouses and the development of all education courses throughout the Marine Corps to include distance learning and resident courses. Course development recommendations are submitted by the schoolhouses and by individual submissions via TECOM's website and the Course Selection Board validates those recommendations. Courses developed by the CCE are reviewed regularly to ensure currency and accuracy.

Marine Corps Institute (MCI) facilitates the MOS training and education of individual Marines by distributing paper copies for most of the officer and enlisted PME courses, as well as many MOS enhancing courses. Additionally, MCI courses can be accessed via the internet through TECOM's marine.net portal. The MCI courses are programmed for updating on a 5-year cycle with those courses with a high enrollment being reviewed on a more frequent basis.

The resources and the budget for MCI are managed by the Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Eighth and I because of their concurrent mission of providing ceremonial support. Therefore, the curriculum oversight for MCI is directed and limited by the resources provided by the CO, Marine Barracks.

Additionally, there is no one command overseeing the course curriculum for the CCE and MCI. The result is similar and redundant courses that are not consistent in testing/course content. An example of this is the Command and Staff College

Non-resident course. There is no overlap between CCE and MCI as to testing and validation of this curriculum. Another example is the administrative class, Pay and Entitlements; it is outdated and provides inaccurate information to our Marines.

There seems to be a disparity in promotion points and reserve retirement credit points. Courses completed through MCI are given credit for promotion and reserve retirement, however no credit is granted for courses taken through CCE Interactive Multimedia Instruction (IMI), except PME classes.

MCRPB RECOMMENDATION: DL is a necessity for the Reserve Component. With the capabilities of technology, our Reserve Marines can accomplish more with less cost and time. The impact is a greater citizen-soldier. In order to provide an overall program to better serve all Marines, the Commandant should review the Distance Learning programs within the Marine Corps to ensure they are complementary and consistent. This would probably involve a transition of the functions inherent within MCI to more closely align with those in TECOM (CCE). We believe TECOM is already going in the right direction with their IMI initiatives.

To enhance the DL program's overall functionality for Reserve Forces we recommend:

1. Compulsory Training. Provide more courses required as annual training requirements; for example, EEO/Diversity, Ethics, Water Safety, BST, etc. This training allows all Marines to complete these annual requirements on-line and thus eases the training burden to entire commands. Reserve Marines could complete the training off duty and not have to spend an entire drill weekend accomplishing basic training requirements.

2. Enlisted PME (EPME). Focus on all EPME requirements. The classroom material could be accomplished via Interactive Multimedia Instruction (IMI) prior to attendance at the EPME School. The school time could be drastically reduced, they could concentrate more attention on field training, and it would enable more Marines to attend.

3. Reserve Specific Training. Develop classes on Career Retirement Credit Report (CRCR), Promotion, Legal, and the Marine Corps Reserve. While these courses are pertinent to the Marine Corps Reserve, they serve to assist the I&I/Site Support Staff members in providing Reserve support as necessary.

4. Reserve Policies. Continue to evaluate the IMI to ensure reserve retirement credit points and promotion points are granted for applicable courses similar to the MCI courses.

5. Blended Course Packages. Use a blended approach to courses that provide DL training coordinated with mandatory attendance at formal school. Develop courses that will reduce the mandatory attendance at a formal school.

6. MCI. The oversight of the curriculum of MCI should be evaluated to ensure the courses provided to our Marines are updated/revised as appropriate on at least a yearly basis to ensure currency of material. Recommend the current MCI courses be reviewed and any courses that have not had a curriculum review within the last 2 years be pulled from rotation until an appropriate review can be accomplished. This will prevent our Marines from "learning" outdated/inaccurate processes.

CMC COMMENT:

DASN (RA) COMMENT:

2003 MARINE CORPS RESERVE POLICY BOARD (MCRPB) ISSUE 03-004

SUBJECT: Synchronization of the Timely Mobilization of Navy Personnel in Support of Marine Forces Reserve

DISCUSSION: The mobilization and synchronization of Program 9 Personnel (PG9: Navy Reserve's support of the USMC) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has revealed significant issues that impacted the mobilization of Marine Force Reserve (MFR) units. "Synchronization" is the process of joining Navy personnel to Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units in a timely manner in order to meet the unit's deployment schedule. PG 9 includes medical, dental, religious and naval gunfire support personnel. The mobilization timelines for Marine units and the corresponding PG9 personnel were significantly different. In some cases, as many as 3 weeks transpired before the Marine unit was staffed with these essential Navy personnel and able to deploy from their Intermediate Location (ILOC).

Many causal factors have been identified for these delays and problems with synchronization. Specifically, these problems include: re-validation of requirements, timely notification, identification of the PG9 Selected Reservists (SELRES) shortfalls and Military Augmentation Personnel (MAP), incorrect billet fit, individual SELRES failure to process through the Navy Medical Personnel Support (NMPS) site, and dissimilar (MFR vs. CNRF) Delay, Deferment and Exemption (DD&E) policy. The average total delay was 14 days and as long as 22 days was noted.

Multiple parallel efforts to redesign the synchronization process are underway. Flag meetings at multiple levels are generating intense pressure for the right changes that will fulfill the USMC and MFR needs while preserving the essence of PG9. Streamlining the entire mobilization process is required while still meeting the monthly readiness requirements of the Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Centers. The Marine Corps currently has no ownership or control of the synchronization process. As a result, the process has demonstrated so many significant failures that a complete rework is absolutely necessary to meet MFR activation timelines. This new design is particularly important in today's Sea Power 21 transformation. Agility and speed of employment is essential.

MCRPB RECOMMENDS:

SECNAV sponsor Navy and Marine Corps workshop by the end of 2nd QTR FY04 to discuss the transfer to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) singular authority to mobilize and activate SMCR assigned PG9 personnel, in support of Marine Forces Reserve.

This transfer of authority to mobilize and activate PG9 personnel would dramatically decrease mobilization delays 7-9 days because it would eliminate the need for N3/N5 revalidation of mobilization readiness and requirements. Pre-validation of PG 9 personnel would be accomplished with the by-name assignment of PG9 personnel to the SMCR unit T/O to meet the unit's operational requirements. Once CMC validates the SMCR T/O it automatically validates the PG9 personnel requirements in a single synchronized step. Individual personal and medical readiness would be tracked at the unit level as part of the reserve unit's pre-mobilization planning.

CMC COMMENT:

DASN (RA) COMMENT:

2003 MARINE CORPS RESERVE POLICY BOARD (MCRPB) ISSUE 03-005

SUBJECT: Program 9 (PG9) Manning Shortfalls in Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Hospital Corpsman (HM) Billets (NEC 8404)

DISCUSSION: A significant number of FMF HM billets within Program 9 (PG9) are currently unfilled. The Table of Organization (T/O) requires 1,845 FMF Corpsman; however, only 1,389 billets are funded. This difference (456) between T/O and funded billets is accepted by CMC due to budgetary constraint. A large portion of the funded billets (528) is manned with Medical Augment Personnel (MAP), who are specifically identified Active Component (AC) personnel. Twenty-seven percent (27%), or 361, of the remaining 811 Selected Reserve (SELRES) billets are unfilled. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the 8404 SELRES shortfall was filled with HMs from other Naval Hospital platforms. Discussions are underway within MFR and CNRF to address these manpower and training issues.

There are many reasons for the shortfall of PG 9 HM's. FMF service is physically demanding and often requires service in austere environments. For this reason, some 8404s do not wish to serve with Marine units.

More significantly, there are career disincentives that make Marine Corps service unattractive. Career paths within FMF service do not exist and require that the 8404 seek non-operational platforms in order to be competitive amongst their HM peers. Command Advancement Programs (CAP) do not exist. Financial incentives, in the form of weekend drill bonuses, are in place but have not been utilized.

Marine emphasis on field exercises during reserve training periods makes it extremely difficult for HM's to access computer-based medical specialty training. This is especially important because TASK FORCE EXCEL and SEA WARRIOR (which allows better management of enlisted assignment) require clinical specialization for career advancement.

Policies that give HM's incentive to serve with MFR will narrow the current shortfall and maintain the viability of PG9.

MCRPB RECOMMENDS:

1. CNO and CMC convene an Integrated Project Team (IPT)by the end of 2nd QTR FY04 to address the career pathway specifically focused on the competitiveness of HMs who would serve with Marines including the design of an 8404

career. Task Force Excel and Sea Warrior should be tailored considering the impact on the staffing of FMF Corpsman.

2. Additionally, CNO and CMC should review the current manpower mix to meet the needs of MFR readiness including recruiting priorities and service incentives for training and retention along with a service policy for early FMF School training of a larger portion of the recruited population for assignment to both the AC and RC.

CMC COMMENT:

DASN (RA) COMMENT: